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Abstract
We use a novel household survey to investigate the effects of employer-based ﬁnancial
education on personal saving. We explore cross-sectional relations between the availability
of employer-based ﬁnancial education and various measures of asset accumulation, and we
interpret these patterns in light of various potentially confounding factors. Our ﬁndings
favor the hypothesis that employer-based ﬁnancial education stimulates saving, both in
general and for retirement.
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1. Introduction
During the 1980s, a small but signiﬁcant minority of employers instituted
educational programs to provide employees with information about ﬁnancial
decisions and retirement planning. Spurred in part by the increasing popularity of
employee-directed pension plans such as 401(k)s (see e.g. Employee Beneﬁt
Research Institute, 1995), the rate of adoption accelerated considerably in the
1990s. As of 1994, 88% of large employers offered some form of ﬁnancial
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1 education, and more than two-thirds had added these programs after 1990. More
recent evidence indicates that ﬁnancial education in the workplace continued to
2 spread at a rapid pace throughout the late 1990s. If poor ﬁnancial decisions result
with sufﬁcient frequency from failures to appreciate ﬁnancial vulnerabilities or
from misunderstandings of intertemporal tradeoffs (see Bernheim, 1994, 1995a),
then education of this form may inﬂuence a wide range of behaviors, including
plan participation, voluntary contributions, portfolio mix, and the individual’s
overall rate of saving.
The potential effects of ﬁnancial education are interesting and important from a
policy perspective. There is a widespread perception that the rates of national and
personal saving are too low, and the efﬁcacy of Individual Retirement Accounts
3 (IRAs) and other tax policies is controversial. Moreover, some observers
speculate that the post-War increase in saving by Japanese households may have
been at least partially attributable to an extensive educational and promotional
4 campaign. The growth of employer-based ﬁnancial education has therefore
attracted attention within policy circles. Indeed, in 1995, the Department of Labor
announced its intention to launch ‘a national pension education program aimed at
drawing the attention of American workers to the importance of taking personal
responsibility for their retirement security’ (Berg, 1995, p. 2).
In this paper, we use a novel cross-sectional survey of US households to
investigate the efﬁcacy of employer-based ﬁnancial education. Our primary focus
concerns the effects of these programs on saving, both in general and for the
5 purposes of retirement. Holding ﬁxed a wide range of observable characteristics
including pension status, we ﬁnd that virtually all measures of retirement
accumulation (both stocks and ﬂows) are signiﬁcantly higher on average and at the
25th and 50th percentiles when the respondent’s employer offers ﬁnancial
education. We also ﬁnd that rates of participation in 401(k) plans are signiﬁcantly
higher, both for the respondent and for his or her spouse, when ﬁnancial education
is available. For measures of total accumulation, the evidence is mixed. We ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant relationship on average and at the 25th and 50th percentiles for the rate
of saving (a ﬂow variable), but essentially no relationship for total wealth (a stock
variable). For the 75th percentile, none of the estimated coefﬁcients are statistically
signiﬁcant.
We interpret these ﬁndings in light of several potential confounding considera-
1‘Employees getting more: Investment education, planning help on the increase,’ Pensions &
Investments, January 23, 1995, p. 74.
2Overall, 86% of 401(k) plan sponsors indicated that they provided ﬁnancial education to employees
in 1999, compared with 59% in 1997 (Hewitt Associates, 2000).
3See Bernheim (1997, 1999) for reviews of the literature on taxation and saving.
4Naturally, there are other explanations for the Japanese experience. See Bernheim (1991) and
Central Council for Savings Promotion (1981).
5Due to data limitations, we are unable to study the effects of employer-based ﬁnancial education on
portfolio allocation. Weisbenner (1999) provides some indirect evidence concerning this issue.B.D. Bernheim, D.M. Garrett / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 1487–1519 1489
tions: that the availability of ﬁnancial education in the workplace may be
systematically correlated with the underlying predisposition to save, that our
estimates may confound the effects of unobserved plan characteristics, and that
education may effect reporting, rather than behavior. Though we are cognizant of
the limits of cross-sectional analysis, we believe that our results favor the
hypothesis that ﬁnancial education signiﬁcantly stimulates retirement saving
among low and moderate savers. Indeed, because employers typically institute
ﬁnancial educational programs for remedial purposes (that is, when employees are
predisposed against saving), cross-sectional estimates may understate the effects
of these programs. Though the pertinent evidence is somewhat less direct, further
analysis supports the view that the associated increase in retirement saving
represents a net contribution to total saving rather than asset shifting.
This study complements a small collection of roughly contemporaneous papers
that use data gathered from employers to examine the effects of employer-based
ﬁnancial education on 401(k) participation and plan balances (Bayer et al., 1996;
Bernheim, 1998; Clark and Schieber, 1998). An important limitation of employer
data is that it does not permit one to examine assets held outside of retirement
plans. Even if education has a sizable impact on voluntary pension contributions,
its effect on total saving (or even total saving for retirement) may be small. For
example, education may simply induce households to reshufﬂe their assets
between pension accounts and other instruments for saving. To investigate these
critical issues, one requires household survey data. The current study makes a
unique contribution to the literature by providing the only available evidence
concerning the relation between ﬁnancial education in the workplace and total
household saving (including saving outside of pension plans).
Existing evidence on the effects of retirement education in the workplace also
includes qualitative surveys and non-academic case studies. In one survey
(Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute, 1994), 92% of 401(k) participants said that
they read materials provided by their employers; of those, 44% said that they
allocated their funds differently, and 33% said that they contributed more to their
plans. A more recent survey (Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute, 2001) found
that workers who took advantage of opportunities for ﬁnancial education in the
workplace were more likely to undertake a retirement needs calculation (53 vs.
32%), to alter ﬁnancial decisions after making such a calculation (66 vs. 37%),
and to save for retirement (82 vs. 50%). Unfortunately, if attitudes toward saving
are systematically related to factors that determine the likelihood of using
educational materials, then these statistics confound behavioral responses with
selection effects. It is also possible that individuals are simply reluctant to report
that they ignore education after receiving it. Finally, neither survey attempted to
measure the magnitude of the treatment effect. Employers who enhanced their
educational efforts also tend to report increases in plan participation (A. Foster
Higgins & Co., Inc., 1994), but the available evidence does not establish whether
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changes in participation (see e.g. Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute, 1995, or
Borleis and Wedell, 1994), but the link to education is usually speculative, and
often confounded by other factors. For example, one company views its communi-
cations program as the ‘most important factor’ behind its 92% 401(k) participation
rate, but the factual basis for this inference is unclear (Geisel, 1995). Notably, all
of these studies focus exclusively on decisions pertaining to pension plans; none of
them examine the impact of ﬁnancial education on broad measures of saving.
The current study is also related to work by Bernheim et al. (2001), which
examines the long-term effects of state-wide high school ﬁnancial curriculum
mandates. Exploiting the variation in requirements both across states and over
time, these authors ﬁnd that mandates signiﬁcantly raise both exposure to ﬁnancial
curricula and subsequent asset accumulation once exposed students reach adult-
hood. There is also a more distant relation to various papers that document
correlations between an individual’s general level of educational attainment and
his or her rate of saving (documented by Bernheim and Scholz, 1993, and by
Hubbard et al., 1995). Naturally, these correlations may be attributable to other
related factors, such as permanent income and rates of time preference.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some
general background information concerning ﬁnancial education in the workplace.
Section 3 describes the data used in our analysis. Section 4 presents cross-sectional
estimates of the relation between the availability of employer-based ﬁnancial
education and various measures of asset accumulation. Section 5 interprets the
cross-sectional patterns in light of the potentially confounding factors mentioned
earlier. It also examines the hypothesis that ﬁnancial education stimulates
retirement saving by inducing workers to shift assets without increasing overall
saving. Section 6 concludes.
2. Background on ﬁnancial education in the workplace
The characteristics of ﬁnancial education in the workplace vary widely from
employer to employer. Programs differ along three primary dimensions: content,
media, and frequency.
Educational content falls into several categories. For our purposes, the most
important category concerns topics related to the level of saving. Speciﬁc subjects
include retirement income sources and needs (including ‘retirement gap’ calcula-
tions), the establishment of goals, the importance of pension plan participation, the
impact of preretirement withdrawals on retirement income, the advantages of early
and regular saving (including the beneﬁts of compounding), budgeting, and debt
reduction.While emphasis varies, sizable majorities cover retirement income needs
(73%) and general retirement strategies (88%) (Employee Beneﬁt ResearchB.D. Bernheim, D.M. Garrett / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 1487–1519 1491
Insitute, 1995). Topics related to asset allocation, including the concepts of risk,
risk tolerance, diversiﬁcation, and the characteristics of various assets, comprise a
second category.Virtually all employer-based ﬁnancial education programs include
some coverage of these subjects (Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute, 1995).
Other common topics include basic investment terminology, the effects of
inﬂation, the beneﬁts of dollar cost averaging, the role of the investor’s time
horizon, tax issues, and details of the employer’s pension plan.
Employers provide educational materials to workers through a variety of media.
Written information is particularly widespread. According to one recent survey
(Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute, 2001), of those workers whose employers
offer some form of ﬁnancial education, 89% receive beneﬁt statements, 85%
receive brochures, 59% receive either newsletters or magazines, and 54% have
access to workbooks and worksheets. It is also quite common for employers to
offer information through media that involve personal contact. Among employees
of ﬁrms with educational programs, 57% have access to a ﬁnancial planner, 57%
can obtain investment advice, and 54% are eligible to attend seminars. The use of
electronic media is growing at an explosive pace. In 2001, on-line educational
materials were available to 47% of employees at ﬁrms with educational programs,
up from only 4% in 1998. Smaller fractions of these employees have access to
computer software (15%) and informational videos (20%).
Practitioners generally agree that the success of an employer-based ﬁnancial
education program hinges on regular reinforcement of a clear and consistent
message. Some programs provide information only when the employee is hired,
upon enrollment, or in the context of a temporary campaign. Others publish
regular newsletters, maintain ongoing seminar series, distribute periodic beneﬁt
statements, and engage in other high-frequency activities. Among employers with
401(k) plans and educational programs in 1999, six of ten maintained ongoing
communications campaigns (Hewitt Associates, 2000).
Practitioners also typically recommend that employers tailor the content, media,
and frequency of ﬁnancial education programs to the characteristics and needs of
their employees. Employers are advised to select educational messages that pertain
to employees’ concerns, to pitch these messages at an understandable level, and to
select media that are most conducive to presentations that effectively attract and
maintain attention. Whether employers actually follow this advice is an open
question. In practice, relatively little is know about the manner in which
educational programs vary with employee characteristics. Bayer et al. (1996) ﬁnd
that, controlling for other factors, the use of seminars, summary plan descriptions,
newsletters, and periodicals among 401(k) plan sponsors is not signiﬁcantly related
to whether the plan covers union employees. Since unionized and non-unionized
workers differ with respect to a variety of factors (including average income and
education), this ﬁnding suggests that the features of educational programs may
vary relatively little with employee characteristics.1492 B.D. Bernheim, D.M. Garrett / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 1487–1519
3. The data
Unfortunately, none of the standard sources of information on household
ﬁnances (such the Survey of Consumer Finances, the Survey of Income and
Program Participation, and the Panel Study on Income Dynamics) contain
information on employer-based retirement education. To address the nexus of
issues discussed in Section 1, it was necessary to collect new data.
The ﬁrst author of this paper has directed an ongoing project to monitor the
adequacy of personal saving through annual household surveys (see Bernheim,
1995b). For the Fall of 1994, the survey instrument was expanded to cover a
number of new topics, including employer-based ﬁnancial education. Data were
collected during the month of November from a national sample of respondents
6 between the ages of 30 and 48. A total of 2055 surveys were completed.
The survey gathered standard economic and demographic information, including
household assets and liabilities, rates of saving, earnings, income, pension
coverage, employment status, gender, marital status, age, ethnic group, education,
and household composition. It also covered less standard topics, such as retirement
education in the workplace, economic and ﬁnancial knowledge, sources of
information and advice on retirement planning, and childhood experiences of
possible relevance to later ﬁnancial decisions.
One potential concern is that the survey was administered by telephone. While
telephone interviews are usually regarded as less reliable than face-to-face
interviews, the survey was designed to achieve a high level of compliance and to
assure accuracy. Questions were sequenced according to their degree of invasive-
ness. This permitted interviewers to establish credibility, to place respondents at
ease, and to engage them in the interview process. Interviewers ﬁrst asked
respondents to assess their own levels of ﬁnancial knowledge, and then moved on
to childhood experiences (whether the respondent received an allowance, held a
regular job, and so forth), sources of information and advice about retirement
(including ﬁnancial education in the workplace), and questions designed to test
economic and ﬁnancial knowledge. Invasive questions concerning assets and
earnings were deferred until later in the survey, and the most innocuous of these
(for example, the household’s rate of saving) were placed before the most
problematic ones (primarily those designed to elicit asset holdings). As a result,
rates of refusal to individual questions were surprisingly low among those
6The survey was designed in cooperation with the ﬁrst author of this paper and ﬁelded for Merrill
Lynch by Survey Communications, Inc., using a proprietary CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone
Interviewing) system. Sampling was based on automated generation and execution of random phone
numbers, using an algorithm designed to ensure representativeness. Direct electronic data entry
permitted automated control of skip patterns and eliminated the possibility of transcription errors.
Respondents who terminated their interviews before completion of the survey were deleted from the
ﬁnal sample. Information on the frequency of disconnects is not available.B.D. Bernheim, D.M. Garrett / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 1487–1519 1493
completing the survey: 79.1% of respondents provided quantitative answers to all
questions concerning components of wealth, and 90.4% provided quantitative
answers to all questions concerning earnings. While high response rates are
encouraging, it is important to judge the reliability of the data by making
appropriate comparisons with known benchmarks (see below).
3.1. Measures of ﬁnancial education in the workplace
The survey contains two questions concerning retirement education in the
workplace. The ﬁrst asks whether the respondent’s employer offers seminars,
professional assistance, or informative materials to assist with retirement planning.
The second question asks whether the respondent has taken advantage of these
offerings. Nearly all respondents (2036 of 2055) provided usable answers (‘yes’ or
‘no’ rather than ‘don’t know’ or ‘refused’) to both of these questions. Obviously,
these are coarse measures of exposure to the wide variety of employer-based
retirement education programs discussed in Section 2. Unfortunately, detailed
descriptions of program structure and content are not available. Because we lump
all programs together, our analysis probably understates the effects of the best
programs. However, because individuals are presumably more likely to recall (and
report) more effective educational efforts, our results may overstate the effects of
the average program.
Just over one-half (53.6%) of working respondents report that their employers
offer some form of retirement education. The availability of education is highly
correlated with pension eligibility. Of employed respondents without pensions,
only 26.6% say that educational programs are available. In contrast, 68.9% of
those covered only by 401(k)s, 58.2% of those covered only by other pension
plans, and 76.4% of those covered by both types of plans report the existence of
7 educational options. Since these options have become common even in the
absence of 401(k)s, the growth of self-directed plans does not appear to be the sole
8 factor motivating the growth of retirement education in the workplace.
Overall, slightly more than three-quarters (76.9%) of respondents with access to
retirement education in the workplace report that they make use of these
opportunities. This is lower than the 92% ﬁgure (which refers to the fraction of
workers who read written materials provided by their employers) reported by
7A relatively small number of those who describe themselves as ‘not working’ nevertheless report
that their employers offer some form of retirement education. These respondents may have in mind
educational programs offered by past employers, their spouse’s employer, or a school that they attend.
8Conceivably, ‘other pensions’ may include some self-directed plans. However, our ‘401(k)’
category is intended to include ‘other tax-deferred salary reduction plans,’ which subsumes many other
common self-directed plans, such as 403(b)s. Of course, some respondents may have misclassiﬁed their
pensions, but misclassiﬁcation would have to be extremely common to explain the observed differences
between those with and without other pensions. Notably, Bayer et al. (1996) corroborate our ﬁndings
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EBRI (1994). The usage rate is higher for workers covered only by 401(k)s
(79.9%) than for workers without pensions (69.1%). However, those covered
exclusively by pensions other than 401(k)s are only marginally more likely to
participate in educational programs than those who have no pension coverage
(69.2 vs. 69.1%), and those with both 401(k)s and some other plan are only
slightly more likely to participate than those covered by 401(k)s alone (80.2 vs.
79.9%). Thus, the existence of a pension plan does not appear to affect
signiﬁcantly the likelihood of worker participation in retirement education
offerings unless the plan has self-directed features that require active participant
decision-making.
When ﬁnancial education is available in the workplace, 27.0% of respondents
report that their employers are the most important sources of advice and
information concerning retirement planning, compared to only 7.4% of employees
in instances where education is not offered. Reliance on ﬁnancial professionals
differs little between these two groups (23.3 and 24.3%, respectively), but reliance
on parents, friends and relatives is lower in the presence of educational offerings
(19.2 vs. 24.6%), as is reliance on the individual’s own judgement (9.3 vs.
14.5%). These patterns are consistent with (but certainly do not prove) the
hypotheses that many employees rely heavily on ﬁnancial education in the
workplace, and that this education most commonly displaces non-authoritative
sources of assistance. Thus, there is considerable scope for employer-based
education to affect ﬁnancial choices.
3.2. Measures of asset accumulation
Data collected in this survey allow us to study the relations between employer-
based ﬁnancial education and six distinct measures of asset accumulation. We use
three deﬁnitions of wealth, differentiated by breadth. In order of increasing
inclusiveness, we consider asset accumulation within 401(k)s, total accumulation
for retirement, and total accumulation for all purposes. Here and throughout the
remainder of this paper, we use the term ‘401(k)’ to refer to any employer-
sponsored, participant-directed, tax-deferred, salary-reduction retirement plan,
even though many of these plans technically fall under other sections of the tax
code (such as 403(b)s). For each deﬁnition of wealth, we study a measure of ﬂows
and a measure of stocks.
Since employer-based ﬁnancial education is most common among ﬁrms offering
401(k)s, it is appropriate to study the effects on accumulation within these plans.
Survey respondents were asked whether they were eligible to participate in ‘a
401(k) or some other tax-deferred salary reduction plan’ sponsored by their
employers, and whether they actually participated. Irrespective of their answers to
these questions, they were asked to report accumulated balances in tax-deferred
salary reduction plans sponsored by past or present employers. They were also
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questions, we obtained a measure of ﬂows into 401(k) plans (current participation),
as well as a measure of stocks (total plan balances).
Since individuals can shift retirement saving between employer-sponsored plans
and other accounts (such as IRAs), it is also important to examine the impact of
ﬁnancial education on total accumulation for retirement. Survey respondents were
asked to report the percentage of household earnings (not including income
received from assets and investments) currently saved for retirement (our ﬂow
measure), as well as the total amount of money accumulated to date speciﬁcally
for retirement (our stock measure).
Since individuals can also shift saving between retirement accounts and other
assets, it is important to examine the impact of ﬁnancial education on overall
accumulation. Survey respondents reported the percentage of household earnings
currently saved in all forms (our ﬂow measure), as well as various components of
9 assets and liabilities, from which we construct net wealth (our stock measure).
Several important issues arise with respect to our measures of asset accumula-
tion. First, self-reported rates of saving are suspect because they do not necessarily
reﬂect the consistent application of appropriate economic concepts. For example,
some individuals may report the fractions of their paychecks that they put away,
while others may (despite the wording of the questions) count some portion of
10 reinvested capital income (e.g. realizations) as both income and saving. This
disadvantage is at least partially offset by the fact that questions about rates are
less invasive than questions about asset values; as a result, we may obtain more
honest answers. It is also obvious from the results discussed later in Section 4 that
reported rates of saving contain more than random noise. They are highly
correlated with total net wealth (presumably reﬂecting serial correlation in rates of
saving), and they exhibit the expected correlations with variables such as 401(k)
eligibility and education, even controlling for wealth. Absent either a true panel or
a detailed log of household spending, self-reported rates of saving are the only
available measures of ﬂow saving. While they are admittedly imperfect, they do
9Net wealth is deﬁned as the total value of homes, businesses, other real property, and ﬁnancial
assets (including cash, bank accounts, retirement accounts, and other investments such as stocks, bonds,
and mutual funds), minus debt. This measure of net wealth only encompasses assets that are subject to
the household’s discretion. Note that it excludes the value of future income derived from deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plans and Social Security. In our view, it is not possible to construct reasonable
estimates of deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth and Social Security wealth using the available data. For our
empirical analysis, we therefore attempt to explain discretionary net wealth, controlling where possible
for non-discretionary accumulations (e.g. through the inclusion of binary variable summarizing deﬁned
beneﬁt pension eligibility).
10It is worth noting that no respondent reports negative saving, despite the fact that some households
undoubtedly dissave. This probably reﬂects the fact that most individuals do not think about saving and
dissaving symmetrically. For those who dissave, it is probably more natural to report that they save
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appear to provide meaningful information on ﬂow saving, and are therefore
worthwhile subjects of analysis.
Second, the distinction between total wealth and retirement wealth, and the
analogous distinction between the overall rate of saving and the rate of saving for
retirement, may be imprecise and subjective. Some individuals may earmark funds
for particular purposes, while others may regard their resources as fungible. While
these distinctions are sharper when individuals use targeted retirement savings
vehicle (e.g. IRAs, 401(k)s, variable annuities, and life insurance products), some
individuals may save for retirement through other vehicles, or save for other
objectives (such as college education) through a retirement account. Nevertheless,
high response rates indicate that most individuals do earmark some portion of their
wealth psychologically, if not physically, for retirement.
3.3. Comparisons with benchmarks
To evaluate the reliability of these data, we undertake comparisons with other
recognized data sources. In particular, for both the March 1995 Current Population
Survey (CPS) and the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), we construct
comparison samples by mimicking the selection criteria for the Merrill Lynch
household survey sample.We include all single individuals between the ages of 30
and 48. For each married couple, we randomly designate either the husband or the
wife as a ‘pseudo-respondent,’ and include the household if the pseudo-respon-
dent’s age is between 30 and 48. We compute benchmark statistics for demo-
graphics and earnings based on the CPS sample; for assets, we use the SCF
sample. In all cases, we apply appropriate population weights. Results appear in
Table 1.
11 The ﬁrst section of the table provides statistics on demographic characteristics.
It is evident that there are disproportionate numbers of homeowners and highly
educated individuals in the Merrill Lynch survey. Married individuals and whites
are over-represented to a lesser degree. High frequencies of homeowners and
married individuals should not be surprising, as there is a greater likelihood of
contacting at least one member of such a household.
Selectivity based on demographics is not particularly troubling. Of greater
concern is the accuracy of information on potentially sensitive ﬁnancial topics,
such as earnings and assets. The second section of Table 1 provides statistics on
earnings. To remove the effects of differences in demographic composition, we
conﬁne attention to full-time white employees, and tabulate median earnings
11For couples, ethnicity and education pertain to the respondent in the Merrill Lynch sample, and to
the pseudo-respondent in the CPS sample.B.D. Bernheim, D.M. Garrett / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 1487–1519 1497
Table 1
Summary statistics and comparisons with benchmarks
ab Variable and subgroup Sample Benchmark
Percent married 73.0 66.9
Percent single male 13.1 16.4
Percent single female 13.8 16.7
Percent white 87.2 84.3
Percent non-white 12.8 15.7
Percent no degree 3.6 10.3
Percent high school degree only 56.2 60.9
Percent college degree 40.2 28.9
Percent homeowners 79.1 57.6
Median earnings (white, full time employees)
c Men, no high school degree 25,000 21,000
Men, high school degree only 35,000 32,000
Men, college degree 50,000 50,000
d Women, no high school degree 15,000 12,000
Women, high school degree only 21,000 21,000
Women, college degree 33,000 35,000
Median 401(k) & thrift balances (full sample)
Earnings,$25,000 5000 3500
$25,000#Earnings,$50,000 9000 9000
$50,000#Earnings,$75,000 16,000 17,000
$75,000#Earnings,$100,000 25,000 31,300
$100,000#Earnings 50,000 51,140
Median net wealth (full sample)
Earnings,$25,000 14,000 11,343
$25,000#Earnings,$50,000 50,000 45,028
$50,000#Earnings,$75,000 119,000 88,773
$75,000#Earnings,$100,000 175,000 130,264
$100,000#Earnings 315,000 320,769
a For demographic variables and wealth, we use the entire sample. For earnings, we pool information
on respondents and spouses, and select subsamples of males and females between the ages of 30 and
48. For net wealth and 401(k) balances, we weight the observations to produce the same composition of
homeowners and non-homeowners within each earnings category as in the benchmark sample.
b For demographic variables, we establish benchmarks by drawing a comparable sample of
households from the March 1995 Current Population Survey (CPS). Speciﬁcally, we include single
individuals between the ages of 30 and 48. For each married couple, we randomly select either the
husband or the wife, and include the household if the selected individual’s age is between 30 and 48.
For earnings, we also use the March 1995 CPS, restricting attention either to all males between the ages
of 30 and 48, or all females between these ages. For wealth, we draw a comparable sample of
households from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) following the same procedure as for
the CPS.
c Fifty or fewer observations.
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(through employment or self-employment) separately for men and women with
three different levels of educational attainment. These ﬁgures represent all
respondents (or pseudo-respondents) and spouses between the ages of 30 and 48 in
the samples mentioned above. Generally, the ﬁgures are quite close. The largest
discrepancies for both men and women appear among those without high school
degrees; notably, for the Merrill Lynch sample, both of these groups contain
relatively few observations.
The last two sections of Table 1 contain household medians for 401(k) and thrift
balances (among those with positive balances) and net wealth for the full sample.
To control for differences in education and earnings between the two samples, we
report ﬁgures separately for ﬁve earnings categories. Since homeowners are
signiﬁcantly over-represented in the Merrill Lynch sample, and since they are
known to have signiﬁcantly more wealth than non-homeowners, we weight the
observations within each earnings category to achieve the same distribution across
12 homeowners and non-homeowners as in the benchmark sample. Note that
median 401(k) and thrift account balances for the Merrill Lynch survey sample are
quite close to the benchmarks. Median net wealth in the Merrill Lynch sample
consistently exceeds the benchmarks, but by relatively small margins for house-
holds with earnings below $50,000 and above $100,000. The discrepancies are
larger for households with earnings between $50,000 and $100,000. However,
given the noisiness of most wealth measures, the Merrill Lynch survey ﬁgures for
net wealth appear reasonable, and they exhibit the correct relation to earnings even
within the most problematic range.
Overall, 49% of the respondents in our sample indicate that they are eligible for
401(k)s, and 78% of these report that they participate. The rate of eligibility
increases with income, from 25% among households with total earnings between
$10,000 and $20,000, to 62% for households with total earnings over $75,000.
Similarly, rates of participation for eligible respondents increase from 58% among
those with total earnings between $10,000 and $20,000, to 85% among those with
total earnings over $75,000. According to Poterba et al. (1995), data drawn from
the 1991 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) exhibit similar
patterns, but imply somewhat lower overall rates of eligibility and participation for
the corresponding age group. The discrepancies are potentially attributable to the
increasing popularity of 401(k)s between 1991 and 1995, and to the fact that the
13 Merrill Lynch survey oversampled homeowners.
12Weighting makes relatively little difference for 401(k) balances, but is important for net wealth.
13Notably, employer survey results summarized in Hewitt Associates (2000) place the 401(k)
participation rate at 79% in 1997, which is nearly identical to the self-reported participation rate for our
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4. Cross-sectional patterns
4.1. Estimation issues
One natural approach to the issues at hand would be to estimate ‘treatment
effects’ by studying the relations between our measures of asset accumulation and
the use of ﬁnancial education. Unfortunately, the potential endogeneity of
treatment selection would confound the interpretation of the estimated coefﬁcients.
Similar issues arise in other contexts such as the literature on the returns to
schooling: if years of schooling rise with ability, and if wages rise with ability
ﬁxing years of schooling, then the cross-sectional relation between schooling and
wages tends to overstate the impact of incremental schooling. Likewise, in the
current context, if frugal individuals are more likely to participate in ﬁnancial
education programs, and if these individuals save more ﬁxing the level of ﬁnancial
education, then the cross-sectional relation between saving and ﬁnancial education
tends to overstate the impact of the intervention. One common statistical remedy
for this problem is to use family and environmental attributes as instrumental
14 variables. Naturally, the validity of this approach depends on the properties of the
chosen instrument.
In this paper, concerns about the endogeneity of treatment selection lead us to
study the relation between asset accumulation and the availability of ﬁnancial
education. While the individual employee determines whether he or she uses a
ﬁnancial education offering, the employer determines the availability of this
15 offering. Thus, different considerations govern the selection process for use and
availability. If availability is exogenous with respect to household saving deci-
sions, then availability is a valid instrument for usage. Rather than estimate the
relation between asset accumulation and the use of ﬁnancial education through an
16 instrumental variables procedure, we simply substitute availability for use. This
is acceptable in the current context because the coefﬁcient of availability has a
natural interpretation: it measures the impact of an intervention on saving without
conditioning on use. Obviously, the validity of our approach depends on the nature
14Examples include Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Card (1993), among many others.
15As discussed in Section 5, an employee may inﬂuence the availability of ﬁnancial education
indirectly, for example through the choice of a job.
16Poterba et al. (1995) adopt a similar approach to measure the effects of 401(k) plans on saving.
Since the availability of a 401(k) plan is probably positively correlated with the underlying
predisposition to save, their estimates presumably tend to overstate the impact of these plans. In
contrast, since the availability of ﬁnancial education appears to be negatively correlated with the
underlying predisposition to save conditional on 401(k) eligibility, our approach tends to understate the
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of the selection process governing availability. In Section 5, we carefully examine
evidence pertaining to this process, and we interpret our cross-sectional estimates
in light of this evidence.
In examining the relation between saving behavior and education, one must also
be cognizant of the fact that the response to education may vary systematically
across the population. While most Americans probably save too little (relative to
ﬁnancial planners’ recommendations), some save adequately, and a few probably
put away signiﬁcantly more than is necessary. Education may promote thrift
among low savers without affecting high savers. Alternatively, if education nudges
each household toward an appropriate mode of behavior, even the direction of its
effect may change as one moves from those who save too little to those who save
excessively. For this reason, it is important to study the relation between ﬁnancial
education and the entire distribution of asset accumulation. To this end, we
employ a combination of regression procedures, including OLS, quantile regres-
sion, and (where appropriate) probit models.
In practice, survey data on wealth and self-reported rates of saving typically
17 have skewed distributions with extreme outliers in thick upper tails. We prefer to
use estimation strategies that moderate the inﬂuence of these outliers, for two
reasons. First, extreme outliers may result from measurement error processes with
non-standard properties (e.g. an incorrect number of zeros, or a whimsical answer).
Second, the relationship between the dependent and independent variables may be
systematically different for households with extreme values of the dependent
variable. For example, the effect of ﬁnancial education on saving may be
negligible for households that inherit large estates from relatives, even if it is
substantial for ordinary households. Quantile regression techniques are reasonably
robust with respect to the presence of such outliers, but OLS is not. To minimize
the inﬂuence of outliers, we convert the dependent variables to population
percentiles (equivalently, population ranks) before ﬁtting OLS regressions. The
coefﬁcients in the resulting equations are easily interpreted: they describe the
effects of changes in the independent variables on the respondent’s position in the
distribution of the dependent variable. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not
report OLS regression results for speciﬁcations in which the untransformed values
of wealth and saving rates are used as dependent variables. In practice, this
approach also yields qualitatively similar results, but in a number of cases the
estimates are simply too imprecise to support reliable inferences.
4.2. Results
Before discussing the regression results, it is useful to summarize the key
patterns in the raw data. We refer the reader to Table 2, which reports statistics on
17For example, six respondents reported total wealth in excess of $5 million, and three indicated that
they saved 100% of income.B.D. Bernheim, D.M. Garrett / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 1487–1519 1501
Table 2
Measures of asset accumulation, by availability of ﬁnancial education in the workplace
Frequency 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
401(k) participation
Education available 0.827
Education not available 0.673
401(k) balances
Education available 1400 9150 25,000
Education not available 0 5000 18,500
401(k) participation, spouse
Education available 0.844
Education not available 0.730
401(k) balances, spouse
Education available 1000 6000 15,000
Education not available 0 5000 20,000
Saving rate—retirement
Education available 3% 6% 10%
Education not available 0% 5% 10%
Retirement wealth
Education available 5000 20,000 40,000
Education not available 0 9000 30,000
Saving rate—total
Education available 5% 10% 15%
Education not available 2% 8% 15%
Total wealth
Education available 24,000 90,000 198,000
Education not available 16,800 90,000 212,000
asset accumulation conditional upon the availability of ﬁnancial education at the
respondent’s workplace. The statistics on 401(k)s are derived from subsamples for
which the respondent (or spouse) was eligible for a 401(k).
Several patterns in Table 2 merit emphasis. Rates of participation in 401(k)
plans are signiﬁcantly higher when the respondent’s employer offers ﬁnancial
education, both for the respondent (a 15.4 percentage point difference) and for the
respondent’s spouse (an 11.4 percentage point difference). This raises the
possibility that education has a positive spillover effect on a spouse’s pension plan
activity. Notice, however, that the gap between plan balances for those with and
without educational offerings at the respondent’s workplace is larger for the
respondent than for the respondent’s spouse. At the 25th percentile, all measures
of asset accumulation are higher when the respondent’s employer offers ﬁnancial
education. The same statement holds at the median, with the exception of total
wealth, for which there is no difference. At the 75th percentile, the pattern is
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offers ﬁnancial education in two cases (401(k) balances and retirement wealth), the
same in two cases (rates of saving for retirement and overall), and lower in two
cases (spouse’s 401(k) balances and total wealth). These differences across
percentiles reinforce the importance of studying the distribution of asset accumula-
tion, rather than a single summary statistic such as the mean.
It is natural to wonder whether the differences in Table 2 are statistically
signiﬁcant, and whether they hold up when one controls for other household
characteristics.We therefore estimate probit regressions for 401(k) participation, as
well as both OLS and quantile regressions for 401(k) balances, saving rates,
retirement wealth, and total wealth. In addition to an indicator variable summa-
rizing the availability of ﬁnancial education at the respondent’s workplace,
18 explanatory variables include: earnings, respondent’s age and education, spouse’s
age and education, dummy variables indicating whether the respondent and spouse
are eligible for 401(k) plans, dummy variables indicating whether the respondent
and spouse are eligible for other pension plans, dummy variables indicating
whether the respondent is married, black, or non-white other than black, and
dummy variables indicating whether the respondent and spouse are self-em-
19 ployed. We also include a variable that measures the respondent’s recollection of
his or her parents’ inclination to save, which we construe as a proxy for
preferences (an interpretation that is consistent with the pattern of estimated
20 coefﬁcients). Finally, for speciﬁcations explaining rates of saving, we include a
21 measure of total wealth. This is justiﬁed by the usual life cycle considerations,
which imply that the associated coefﬁcient should be negative (since higher wealth
should increase consumption). However, if preferences towards saving are
reasonably stable over time, wealth may function primarily as another taste proxy,
in which case one would expect to obtain a positive coefﬁcient. Recall that the
survey solicits current rates of saving, rather than rates of saving for the preceding
18We use the log of earnings to reduce the inﬂuence of outliers in the upper tail of the distribution of
observed earnings. This functional assumption is natural for most of our measures of asset
accumulation. Since contribution to 401(k) balances and other retirement saving accounts are capped,
the marginal effect of earnings must decline with earnings. Similarly, though rates of saving may rise
with earnings, it seems likely that they level off when earnings are sufﬁciently high. To avoid taking
the log of zero for non-earners, we ﬁrst add one dollar to earnings. For 401(k)s, we differentiate
between respondent’s earnings and spouse’s earnings, on the grounds that the earnings of the eligible
individual may be more closely related to plan activity. For all other measures of asset accumulation
(which pertain to the entire household), we use total household earnings.
19We include self-employment indicators because self-employed individuals have different saving
opportunities, and may conceive of wealth and saving differently from others.
20Our results are not particularly sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of this variable.
21As in speciﬁcations for which wealth is the dependent variable, we use the percentile rank of total
wealth. Due to the presence of extreme outliers, this variable explains variation in saving rates far
better than the level of wealth. When the latter variable is used, the associated coefﬁcient is typically
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year. It is therefore appropriate to regard current wealth as a predetermined
(though not necessarily exogenous) variable.
We present complete estimates for our various speciﬁcations, along with
associated sample sizes, in Tables 3–6. All probit coefﬁcients are scaled to reﬂect
incremental effects on probability evaluated at sample means. Our primary interest
is in the coefﬁcients for the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s
22 employer offers ﬁnancial education.
According to the results in Tables 3 and 4, rates of participation in 401(k) plans
are signiﬁcantly higher when the respondent’s employer offers ﬁnancial education,
both for the respondent (a 12.1 percentage point difference) and for the respon-
dent’s spouse (a 9.2 percentage point difference). For respondent’s 401(k) balances
(Table 3), the ﬁnancial education coefﬁcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
23 in the OLS regression and at the 25th and 50th percentiles. At the 75th
percentile, one cannot reject the possibility that the coefﬁcient is zero at
conventional levels of conﬁdence. Note also that, as a percentage of balances
(recall Table 2), the estimated effect declines sharply as one moves to higher
percentiles. In this sense, the effect is strongest at the lower end of the saving
distribution. The relation between the availability of ﬁnancial education at the
respondent’s workplace and spouse’s 401(k) balances is much weaker. For the
OLS regression, one can reject the hypothesis that the key coefﬁcient is zero with
only 92% conﬁdence. For the 25th percentile, one can reject this hypothesis with
only 85% conﬁdence; at the median and 75th percentiles, the corresponding
22In the text, we focus exclusively on the coefﬁcients of this key ﬁnancial education variable. For the
most part, other coefﬁcient estimates are sensible, though in some cases they require careful
interpretation. Several examples deserve emphasis. In various speciﬁcations for rates of saving, the
coefﬁcient of respondent’s age is negative. This does not, however, mean that rates of saving decline
with age. The equations also control for earnings and wealth, both of which rise with age, and both of
which are associated with higher saving. The equation merely indicates that a younger individual with
given levels of earnings and wealth tends to save at a higher rate than an older individual with the same
levels of earnings and wealth. This is hardly surprising: the younger individual accumulated the same
wealth more quickly, and therefore is presumably more predisposed to save. Similarly, one must
exercise care when interpreting the coefﬁcients of spouse’s age. As a household ages, this variables
moves in lockstep with respondent’s age. Thus, spouse’s age functions much like an interaction
between marital status and age. When interpreting the coefﬁcients of education (some of which are
negative), one should keep in mind that the speciﬁcations control for income. It is not clear whether one
should expect an unsuccessful highly educated person to save more or less than a successful person
with less education. Finally, since all variables pertaining to the spouse are set equal to zero for single
individuals, the coefﬁcients of the marital status indicator do not measure the typical differences
between married and single respondents.
23These estimates make no allowance the fact that the distribution of 401(k) balances is bounded
below by zero. This is potentially important, since slightly more than 20% of eligible individuals have
no 401(k) balances. We have investigated the importance of this issue by estimating a tobit regression
for respondent’s balances. The estimated coefﬁcient of the key education variable was 11,515; the
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Table 3
Regression results for respondent’s 401(k) activity
Variable Probit for Balances
participation
OLS, % Rank 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
Availability of ﬁnancial 0.121 0.0670 1381 2789 2814
education at workplace (3.58) (3.69) (2.09) (2.86) (0.87)
Eligibility for other 20.0430 20.0149 2293 2813 22830
pension, respondent (21.27) (20.82) (20.45) (20.84) (20.85)
Eligibility for 401(k), 20.0332 0.0096 631 21205 1590
spouse (20.83) (0.46) (0.80) (21.07) (0.43)
Eligibility for other 0.0227 0.0043 232 861 2248
pension, spouse (0.51) (0.17) (0.27) (0.65) (20.06)
Marital status 20.0059 0.0359 678 3451 12,459
(20.09) (0.95) (0.49) (1.70) (1.82)
Black 20.0923 20.0615 21478 22563 24000
(21.67) (22.02) (21.32) (21.57) (20.74)
Other non-white 0.0067 0.0155 1019 2966 889
(0.10) (0.43) (0.81) (1.55) (0.14)
Education, respondent 20.0001 0.0091 258 689 1387
(20.01) (1.41) (1.04) (2.01) (1.28)
Education, spouse 0.0004 20.0077 267.0 2727 227
(0.03) (21.10) (20.25) (21.92) (0.18)
Age, respondent 20.00414 0.0002 7.60 327 795
(21.21) (0.10) (0.11) (3.23) (2.29)
Age, spouse 0.00269 0.0022 46.9 261.1 356
(0.76) (1.15) (0.66) (20.59) (1.02)
Log earnings, 0.103 0.153 3390 10,015 20,981
respondent (3.90) (9.64) (6.16) (11.8) (5.99)
Log earnings, spouse 0.00838 0.0007 28.15 51.3 2967
(1.48) (0.22) (20.08) (0.31) (21.74)
Self-employed, spouse 20.115 20.0442 2895 22963 23754
(21.72) (21.36) (20.73) (21.69) (20.66)
Parent’s saving 0.0021 0.0015 19.9 122 1019
(0.24) (0.30) (0.11) (0.46) (1.13)
Constant 21.09 236,808 2109,861 2250,257
(26.35) (26.24) (211.98) (26.45)
Observations 795 722 722 722 722
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Probit coefﬁcients are scaled to reﬂect incremental effects on
probability evaluated at sample means. Samples consist of all respondents who are eligible for 401(k)s,
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Table 4
Regression results for spouse’s 401(k) activity
Variable Probit for Balances
participation
OLS, % Rank 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
Availability of ﬁnancial 0.0916 0.0452 1030 230.5 3.16
education at workplace (2.28) (1.76) (1.46) (20.02) (0.00)
Eligibility for 401(k), 0.0498 20.0029 2215 1595 640
respondent (1.22) (20.11) (20.31) (1.21) (0.16)
Eligibility for other 20.0383 20.0156 2414 580 22271
pension, respondent (0.84) (20.54) (20.53) (0.41) (20.51)
Eligibility for other 20.0220 20.0656 21321 23232 23055
pension, spouse (20.53) (22.40) (1.79) (22.37) (20.73)
Black 20.0278 20.0963 2841 23372 26764
(20.34) (21.75) (20.57) (21.25) (20.92)
Other non-white 0.720 0.0353 843 3671 5869
(0.91) (0.66) (0.60) (1.42) (0.76)
Education, respondent 20.0136 0.0017 28.20 835 1485
(20.94) (0.18) (20.03) (1.80) (1.11)
Education, spouse 0.0336 0.0178 206 341 2344
(2.37) (2.02) (0.83) (0.77) (1.84)
Age, respondent 0.0015 20.0020 27.81 2136 83.3
(0.29) (20.61) (20.09) (20.82) (0.17)
Age, spouse 20.0001 0.0038 12.8 290 615
(20.01) (1.39) (0.19) (2.10) (1.52)
Log earnings, 0.0083 0.0050 114 235.2 2193
respondent (1.43) (1.25) (1.14) (20.18) (20.32)
Log earnings, spouse 0.0690 0.0624 1590 4233 6086
(3.18) (4.13) (4.81) (5.57) (1.85)
Self-employed, 20.0083 20.0029 2572 2460 2967
respondent (20.15) (20.11) (20.57) (20.25) (20.18)
Parent’s saving 20.0022 20.0015 223.6 1998 545
(20.21) (20.21) (20.12) (0.57) (0.53)
Constant 20.118 216,756 247,534 285,575
(20.67) (24.27) (25.41) (22.40)
Observations 529 397 397 397 397
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Probit coefﬁcients are scaled to reﬂect incremental effects on
probability evaluated at sample means. Samples consist of all observations for which the spouse is
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Table 5
Regression results for retirement accumulation
Variable Saving rate Wealth
OLS 25th 50th 75th OLS 25th 50th 75th
% Rank percentile percentile percentile % Rank percentile percentile percentile
Availability of ﬁnancial 0.0457 0.698 1.10 0.832 0.0362 1047 2200 746
education at workplace (3.20) (3.31) (3.91) (1.20) (2.62) (2.19) (2.37) (0.35)
Eligibility for 401(k), 0.0837 1.46 2.04 2.10 0.102 3146 7092 12,727
respondent (5.82) (6.91) (7.22) (2.96) (7.34) (6.46) (7.59) (5.85)
Eligibility for other 0.0269 0.362 0.395 0.161 0.0659 3587 6714 7419
pension, respondent (1.68) (1.58) (1.25) (0.21) (4.25) (6.68) (6.43) (3.02)
Eligibility for 401(k), 0.0331 0.374 0.915 1.61 0.0489 1643 2075 3325
spouse (2.10) (1.63) (2.94) (2.10) (3.23) (3.08) (2.04) (1.41)
Eligibility for other 0.0182 0.444 0.558 0.050 0.0227 1737 2765 6614
pension, spouse (0.92) (1.58) (1.44) (0.05) (1.21) (2.70) (2.21) (2.25)
Marital status 0.0179 0.082 0.334 0.082 20.0189 21413 22775 27510
(0.71) (0.23) (0.67) (0.07) (20.78) (21.69) (21.71) (22.04)
Black 20.0115 20.439 20.290 20.006 20.0721 21923 22422 23994
(20.44) (21.19) (20.57) (20.01) (22.81) (22.16) (21.42) (21.02)
Other non-white 20.0165 20.382 20.547 0.267 20.0118 2499 2190 2.303
(20.64) (21.04) (21.08) (0.21) (20.48) (20.70) (1.33) (0.62)
Education, respondent 0.0112 0.170 0.211 0.539 0.0258 575 1620 3308
(2.30) (2.42) (2.18) (2.22) (5.56) (3.49) (5.21) (4.71)
Education, spouse 20.0027 0.061 20.035 20.087 0.0169 666 1738 6004
(20.48) (0.76) (20.32) (20.32) (3.21) (3.49) (4.92) (7.50)
Age, respondent 20.0037 20.037 20.071 20.125 0.0070 124 631 1103
(22.42) (21.69) (22.35) (21.64) (4.89) (2.41) (6.56) (4.91)
Age, spouse 0.0039 0.049 0.074 0.138 0.0033 142 243 693
(2.63) (2.32) (2.50) (1.82) (2.32) (2.89) (2.56) (3.15)
Log household earnings 0.0270 0.227 0.226 0.367 0.043 1394 2926 2404
(4.79) (3.50) (2.07) (1.11) (8.23) (10.78) (8.30) (2.14)
Self-employed, 20.0237 20.421 20.676 0.030 0.0148 2212 249.3 5471
respondent (21.25) (21.55) (21.80) (0.03) (0.86) (20.36) (20.04) (2.03)
Self-employed, spouse 20.0416 20.746 20.334 20.237 20.0137 2265 2991 21640
(21.77) (22.20) (20.72) (20.21) (20.64) (20.36) (20.69) (20.49)
Parent’s saving 20.0105 0.103 0.158 0.231 0.0097 339 448 1168
(2.65) (1.80) (2.02) (1.20) (2.59) (2.64) (1.78) (1.98)
Wealth, % rank 0.248 2.93 5.47 8.25
(9.87) (8.10) (11.00) (6.67)
Constant 20.0992 24.23 23.47 24.34 20.600 226,920 265,152 294,851
(21.27) (24.21) (22.29) (21.02) (28.31) (212.32) (213.40) (26.90)
Observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1616 1616 1616 1616
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Table 6
Regression results for total accumulation
Variable Saving rate Wealth
OLS 25th 50th 75th OLS 25th 50th 75th
% Rank percentile percentile percentile % Rank percentile percentile percentile
Availability of ﬁnancial 0.0448 1.39 1.59 1.15 20.0057 22214 21742 3332
education at workplace (3.08) (4.51) (2.96) (1.57) (20.39) (20.54) (20.24) (0.26)
Eligibility for 401(k), 0.0441 2.01 1.23 0.909 0.0616 13,516 21,962 22,369
respondent (3.03) (6.44) (2.29) (1.22) (4.23) (3.38) (3.08) (1.71)
Eligibility for other 0.0253 0.403 0.588 0.516 20.0129 2629 200 217,368
pension, respondent (1.54) (1.18) (0.97) (0.63) (20.78) (20.14) (0.03) (21.17)
Eligibility for 401(k), 0.0397 0.712 1.27 1.75 0.0411 8464 13,617 16,472
spouse (2.48) (2.13) (2.14) (2.22) (2.56) (1.88) (1.73) (1.14)
Eligibility for other 0.0146 0.888 0.266 20.411 0.0049 3310 21310 211,924
pension, spouse (0.73) (2.13) (0.36) (20.417) (0.24) (0.60) (20.13) (20.66)
Marital status 0.0211 0.749 1.18 0.385 0.0224 24335 2472 27893
(0.82) (1.37) (1.24) (0.29) (0.87) (20.62) (20.04) (20.34)
Black 0.0370 0.031 0.236 0.896 20.0631 29946 223,836 232,817
(1.38) (0.06) (0.24) (0.67) (22.36) (21.35) (21.84) (21.38)
Other non-white 20.0337 21.24 21.03 0.339 0.0730 18,437 27,264 40,610
(21.29) (22.31) (21.06) (0.26) (2.75) (2.55) (2.10) (1.71)
Education, respondent 0.0080 0.366 0.439 0.073 0.0150 2737 5984 16,021
(1.62) (3.52) (2.39) (0.29) (3.02) (20.53) (2.47) (3.63)
Education, spouse 20.0142 20.311 20.445 20.489 0.0149 5600 11,962 18,529
(22.50) (22.56) (22.12) (21.73) (2.62) (3.52) (4.30) (3.59)
Age, respondent 20.0062 20.094 20.196 20.281 0.0100 1684 4011 9020
(24.00) (22.93) (23.41) (23.65) (6.54) (3.93) (5.35) (6.36)
Age, spouse 0.0023 0.037 0.054 0.117 0.0029 1575 1543 2432
(1.52) (1.23) (0.97) (1.55) (1.90) (3.62) (2.07) (1.75)
Log household earnings 0.0329 0.382 0.522 0.789 0.0454 20,885 16,167 17,619
(5.55) (4.39) (2.44) (2.25) (7.97) (19.5) (5.78) (2.59)
Self-employed, 20.0199 20.359 0.003 20.017 0.112 19,174 58,618 215,556
respondent (21.04) (20.90) (0.00) (20.02) (5.86) (3.57) (6.27) (12.57)
Self-employed, spouse 20.0315 21.09 20.985 20.729 0.0952 24,351 46,474 113,531
(21.322) (22.20) (21.12) (20.61) (3.97) (3.62) (3.96) (5.31)
Parent’s saving 0.0069 0.068 0.094 0.363 0.0203 4078 8554 12,625
(1.73) (0.81) (0.64) (1.79) (5.07) (3.69) (4.39) (3.48)
Wealth, % rank 0.311 5.91 9.50 14.4
(12.1) (11.10) (10.0) (10.86)
Constant 0.039 23.36 0.329 3.10 20.714 2341,807 2388,106 2599,295
(0.48) (22.36) (0.11) (0.73) (29.15) (219.10) (210.16) (26.97)
Observations 1501 1501 1501 1501 1524 1524 1524 1524
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coefﬁcients are essentially zero. Since baseline 401(k) participation rates exceed
75%, this weak evidence of an effect in the lower tail of the distribution is
consistent with the signiﬁcant increase in participation noted above. The loss of
statistical precision is no doubt attributable in part to the fact that fewer
observations are available for spouse’s 401(k) activity than for respondent’s
401(k) activity.
According to the results in Tables 5 and 6, self-reported rates of saving, both for
retirement and overall, are signiﬁcantly higher on average (OLS) and at the 25th
and 50th percentiles (at the 99.5% conﬁdence level in all cases) when the
respondent’s employer offers ﬁnancial education. However, these effects are
insigniﬁcant at the 75th percentile. The coefﬁcients are expressed in terms of
percentage points. Thus, the median rate of saving for retirement is 1.10
percentage points higher when ﬁnancial education is available. This represents a
22% increase over the baseline median retirement saving rate of 5%. Likewise, the
median rate of overall saving is 1.59 percentage points higher when ﬁnancial
education is available—a 20% increase over the baseline median rate of 8%. Note
that, expressed as a proportion of baseline saving rates, the magnitude of the point
estimates decreases sharply as one moves to higher percentiles.
Retirement wealth is signiﬁcantly higher on average (OLS) and at the 25th and
50th percentiles when the respondent’s employer offers ﬁnancial education (see
Table 5). Once again, this effect is insigniﬁcant at the 75th percentile. The
magnitudes of these effects are reasonably close to those estimated for the
respondent’s 401(k) balances.
Finally, there is little evidence that total wealth is higher on average or at any
percentile when the respondent’s employer offers ﬁnancial education (Table 6).
The estimated coefﬁcients are negative for the OLS regression and at the 25th and
50th percentiles, and positive at the 75th percentile. In all cases, the associated
standard errors are large.
In summary, we ﬁnd the following patterns. Holding ﬁxed all other characteris-
tics (including whether or not the respondent’s employer offers a 401(k)), all
measures of asset accumulation except total wealth tend to be signiﬁcantly higher
on average and in the lower tail of the population distribution when the
respondent’s employer offers ﬁnancial education. Strong effects are also evident at
the median for all measures of wealth accumulation except for total wealth and
spouse’s 401(k) balances. For the 75th percentile, none of the estimated co-
efﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels of conﬁdence.
The disappearance of signiﬁcant effects at the 75th percentile is not surprising.
It is consistent with the view that education encourages saving among those who
save too little, but not among those who already save enough. Though one cannot
rule out the hypothesis that ﬁnancial education is associated with substantially
higher levels of total wealth at any percentile (due to large standard errors), the
absence of any clear evidence along these lines—despite evidence of strong
associations with other measures of asset accumulation—is a puzzle that requiresB.D. Bernheim, D.M. Garrett / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 1487–1519 1509
resolution before one can conﬁdently interpret our ﬁndings. A natural explanation
for this pattern emerges from the considerations discussed at the end of the
following section.
5. Interpreting the cross-sectional patterns
In this section, we discuss four issues pertaining to the proper interpretation of
our cross-sectional estimates: (1) the nature and implications of the selection
process governing the availability of ﬁnancial education in the workplace, (2)
potential biases resulting from the omission of controls for various pension plan
features, (3) the possibility that education may affect the reporting of behavior,
rather than behavior itself, and (4) the possibility that education may induce asset
shifting rather than greater total saving.
5.1. The availability of ﬁnancial education
Motives for the adoption of employer-based retirement education fall into four
categories. First, an employer may hope to avoid liabilities that potentially arise in
the context of self-directed pension plans, such as 401(k)s (Dike, 1994). Second,
an employer may wish to encourage participation among non-highly compensated
employees, thereby addressing non-discrimination requirements that create binding
constraints on pension participation among highly compensated employees (Gar-
rett, 1995). Third, an employer may believe that ﬁnancial education improves
employee motivation, loyalty, and morale by demonstrating concern for employee
welfare, by averting conﬂicts with older, poorly prepared workers, and by
communicating the substantial value of pension beneﬁts, including 401(k) options
(Scott, 1994). Fourth, employees may request assistance with ﬁnancial planning.
Each of these motives has implications for the correlation between education
and the predisposition to save, and hence for selectivity bias. Provided that the
analysis is conditioned on the existence or non-existence of a 401(k), no obvious
bias arises in the context of the ﬁrst motive. For the second and third motives,
education is remedial, and (again conditional on the existence of a 401(k)) tends to
be offered more frequently in situations where employees are predisposed against
saving. For our speciﬁcations, this creates a bias against the ﬁnding that education
stimulates saving. The opposite bias may emerge for the fourth motive, since
high-saving employees may be more likely to demand investment education as a
fringe beneﬁt.
Using panel data for a sample of employers, Bayer et al. (1996) ﬁnd that,
conditional upon pension plan characteristics, low rates of participation, par-
ticularly among non-highly compensated employees, are strongly associated with
the subsequent introduction of employer-based ﬁnancial education. In fact, no
other variable compares in importance as a predictor of subsequent educational1510 B.D. Bernheim, D.M. Garrett / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 1487–1519
activity. This evidence suggests that ﬁnancial education is adopted as a remedial
measure at the instigation of employers in instances where employees are
disinclined to save. Direct survey evidence corroborates this ﬁnding. According to
Bernheim (1998), the most important reasons given for offering ﬁnancial
education are: ‘employees were not thinking enough about retirement,’ and ‘to
increase participation generally.’
In principle, the availability of ﬁnancial education in the workplace could also
be correlated with the typical employee’s underlying predisposition to save
(conditional on pension plan characteristics) if workers sort themselves into jobs
24 based in part on employers’ educational offerings. We discount this possibility
for three reasons. First, since comparable services (retirement seminars, ﬁnancial
planning assistance, etc.) are widely available outside of the workplace, it is
difﬁcult to rationalize non-trivial sorting based on their availability in the
workplace. Second, educational programs spread rapidly in the early 1990s. With
normal labor force turnover, worker self-selection could not have had much of an
impact on employee composition by 1994. Third, workers probably have little
awareness of ﬁnancial education offerings prior to accepting jobs. Since employee
demand is rarely the impetus for adoption, employers do not tend to regard
ﬁnancial education as a strong drawing card, and do little to enhance the visibility
of these programs among potential employees.
Further data analysis yields additional corroboration for the view that our central
ﬁndings are not attributable to spurious conditional correlations between the
availability of ﬁnancial education in the workplace and the respondent’s underly-
ing predisposition to save. Four patterns merit discussion.
5.1.1. The effects of deleting a proxy for ‘tastes’
If the availability of ﬁnancial education is negatively (positively) correlated with
the predisposition to save conditional upon pension status and other characteristics,
then the estimated effects of education should be biased downward (upward).
Typically, one expects the inclusion of taste proxies to reduce this bias, and thus to
increase (decrease) the estimated coefﬁcient. Thus, we can shed some light on the
sign of the bias by omitting or adding taste proxies, and examining the resulting
changes in the key coefﬁcients.
In the saving rate regressions of Tables 5 and 6, wealth apparently functions
primarily as a proxy for the proclivity to save. Indeed, it is arguably the best
available proxy for this inclination. When we exclude wealth from the median
regression for retirement saving, the key education coefﬁcient falls from 1.10 to
0.69; for total saving, it falls from 1.58 to 1.34.We observe this qualitative pattern
for seven out of the eight saving rate regressions in Tables 5 and 6 (the lone
24Sorting based on job characteristics that are correlated with educational offerings, such as the
existence of a pension plan or the type of plan(s) offered, is presumably not problematic provided that
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exception is the equation for rates of retirement saving at the 75th percentile). This
is consistent with the view that the availability of ﬁnancial education is negatively
correlated with the predisposition to save conditional on other characteristics, and
that the estimated effects of education in Tables 3–6 are therefore biased
25 downwards.
As an additional check on the validity of our reasoning, we also examine the
effects of excluding the wealth variable on the coefﬁcients of 401(k) eligibility.
Since high-saving workers tend to seek out jobs that provide access to 401(k)s and
to agitate for the creation of such plans when none exist, eligibility is probably
positively correlated with underlying predispositions to save (see Bernheim, 1997,
1999). We would therefore expect the associated coefﬁcients to increase when we
omit wealth. This occurs in 13 of 16 cases. The coefﬁcient of respondent’s 401(k)
eligibility rises in six of eight cases (the exceptions being the 25th quantile
regression for the retirement saving rate and the 75th quantile regression for the
overall saving rate), while the coefﬁcient of spouse’s 401(k) eligibility rises in
seven of eight cases (the exception being the 75th quantile regression for the
26 retirement saving rate).
5.1.2. Correlations with economic knowledge
Next we examine cross-sectional patterns involving a variable measuring a
blend of ﬁnancial and macroeconomic knowledge (henceforth referred to as
27 ‘economic knowledge’). The variable is constructed from answers to a battery of
25This reasoning abstracts from the possibility that wealth may also depend on education. This
complicates, but does not fundamentally alter the logic of the exercise. Assume that education increases
saving. Consider two individuals, one of whom has received retirement education, and one of whom
has not. Suppose that all other observable characteristics are identical. Since they have the same wealth,
the one without retirement education presumably must have a greater innate predisposition to save.
Thus, controlling for wealth induces a negative partial correlation between education and the taste for
saving, thereby biasing the coefﬁcient of education downward. The omission of wealth eliminates this
bias, but increases the bias associated with conditional correlations between education and the
components of unobserved tastes for which wealth serves as a proxy. If education is positively
correlated with tastes for saving, the two effects work in the same direction, and the omission of wealth
should increase the coefﬁcient of education, contrary to our ﬁndings. If education is negatively
correlated with tastes for saving, then the two effects work in opposite directions, and the omission of
wealth can in principle move the coefﬁcient of education in either direction.
26To illustrate, median regression results are affected as follows. In the speciﬁcation for the rate of
retirement saving, the coefﬁcient of respondent’s 401(k) eligibility rises from 2.04 to 2.53, and the
coefﬁcient of spouse’s 401(k) eligibility rises from 0.92 to 1.78. In the speciﬁcation for the rate of total
saving, the coefﬁcient of respondent’s 401(k) eligibility rises from 1.23 to 1.46, and the coefﬁcient of
spouse’s 401(k) eligibility rises from1.27 to 1.70.
27The regression equations in Tables 3–6 omit economic knowledge even though this variable may
be directly related to behavior. Since our object is to measure the reduced-form effects of ﬁnancial
education in the workplace on behavior, this omission is appropriate. If education affects knowledge
and knowledge affects saving, it would be misleading to control for knowledge when attempting to
measure the total effects of education.1512 B.D. Bernheim, D.M. Garrett / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 1487–1519
28 factual and conceptual questions. For each questions, we assigned a ‘relative
knowledge score,’ deﬁned as the fraction of the population who gave answers that
were at least as far in absolute value as the respondent’s answer from the true
29 answer. This procedure normalizes the scores for each question to reﬂect
difﬁculty, so that no question (or group of questions) dominates the variation in
total scores. For questions that require continuous, quantitative responses, relative
knowledge scores are also less arbitrary than coding answers as ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’
We average the relative knowledge score over the respondent’s answers to obtain
an overall measure of relative knowledge scaled from 0 to 1.
Economic knowledge may be positively correlated with the inclination to save
because knowledge creates the impetus to save, because high savers have greater
incentives to acquire knowledge, or because tastes for saving and tastes for
ﬁnancial knowledge are correlated. For our purposes, the existence of a correlation
is important, but the source is not. Ranking respondents based on test scores,
median wealth is, respectively, $66,000, $75,000, $86,000, and $132,500 for those
in the ﬁrst, second, third, and fourth quartiles. This pattern is not entirely
attributable to common correlations with other variables, such as earnings. When
economic knowledge is added to the long list of explanatory variables in the OLS
wealth regression of Table 6, its coefﬁcient is 0.133, with a t-statistic of 2.44. See
Bernheim (1998) for further evidence on the relation between economic knowl-
edge and wealth.
If, as we have just argued, economic knowledge is positively correlated
(conditional on other covariates) with underlying predispositions to save, then the
relation between this variable and the availability of ﬁnancial education in the
workplace sheds further light on selectivity bias. As it turns out, average test
scores are slightly higher for respondents whose employers offer ﬁnancial
education (0.619 vs. 0.605). However, this is entirely attributable to correlations
30 between economic knowledge and eligibility for 401(k) plans. In a probit
regression explaining the availability of ﬁnancial education as a function of a
range of demographic and economic characteristics, the probability-scaled coefﬁ-
cient of the test score variable is 20.259, with an associated t-statistic of 22.18.
In evaluating this evidence, one must of course be cognizant of the fact that
ﬁnancial education may affect test scores directly. It is reasonable to assume that
28Factual questions concerned rates of unemployment, inﬂation, taxation (in the lowest federal
income tax bracket), and interest (on 30 year mortgages), and levels of the minimum wage, the federal
deﬁcit, federal debt per household, and Dow Jones average. Conceptual questions probed the
respondent’s understanding of real vs. nominal investment returns and risk–return tradeoffs.
29Suppose, for example, that we ask four individuals (A, B, C, and D) the same question. Suppose
that the true answer is ‘5,’ that A answers ‘6,’ B and C answer ‘8,’ and D answers ‘0.’ Then A would
receive a score of 100, B and C would receive scores of 75, and C would receive a score of 25.
30Conditional on the availability of education, test scores are positively correlated with 401(k)
eligibility, but conditional on 401(k) eligibility, test scores are negatively correlated with the
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education does not depress test scores. Consequently, were one to remove the
causal effects of education on knowledge, one would presumably ﬁnd an even
larger negative correlation between test scores and the availability of education,
conditional upon other observed characteristics (including pension status). Thus,
the patterns described in the previous paragraphs corroborate the view that the
conditional correlation between the availability of ﬁnancial education in the
workplace and the respondent’s underlying predisposition to save is negative.
Portions of the preceding discussion suggest that economic knowledge may be a
reasonable proxy for the underlying predisposition to save. If so, and if the
availability of education is negatively correlated with this predisposition (con-
ditional on other observable characteristics), one might expect the relationships
between education and thrift noted in Tables 3–6 to be stronger when economic
knowledge is added to the list of explanatory variables (just as it is weaker in the
saving regressions of Tables 5 and 6 when wealth is removed). There is, however,
an important offsetting effect: if education stimulates saving at least partly because
it improves knowledge, then controlling for knowledge artiﬁcially removes part of
the effect we are trying to measure, thereby biasing the measured impact of
31 education downward. The net effect is ambiguous. In practice, adding this
32 variable to the speciﬁcations makes little difference.
5.1.3. Comparisons between low, medium, and high savers
In Section 4, we documented a strong positive conditional correlation between
the availability of ﬁnancial education and most measures of asset accumulation at
the 25th and 50th percentiles, but not at the 75th percentile. As we have already
mentioned, this is consistent with the view that education encourages thrift among
people who save too little, but not among those who save enough or too much. It
is difﬁcult to identify a plausible source of spurious correlation that would
contaminate our results for the 25th and 50th percentiles, but not for the 75th
percentile. Indeed, if high savers are more likely to agitate aggressively for
educational programs, or if they are more likely to select into ﬁrms that offer
31Controlling for economic knowledge does not remove the entire effect of education on saving
unless (1) our knowledge variable is perfect, and (2) education does not affect saving through other
channels (e.g. by focusing attention on ﬁnancial planning or increasing comfort with ﬁnancial
decision-making).
32To conserve space, we report results only for the OLS speciﬁcations.When a control for economic
knowledge is added, the coefﬁcients for our education variable (with t-statistics in parentheses) are
0.686 (3.80) for respondent’s 401(k) balances, 0.451 (1.75) for spouse’s 401(k) balances, 0.454 (3.19)
for the retirement saving rate, 0.0391 (2.84) for retirement wealth, 0.450 (3.09) for the total rate of
saving, and 20.0040 (20.27) for total wealth. The corresponding coefﬁcients of the economic
knowledge variables (with t-statistics in parentheses) are 0.184 (2.65) for respondent’s 401(k) balances,
20.051 (20.51) for spouse’s 401(k) balances, 20.025 (20.46) for the retirement saving rate, 0.249
(4.93) for retirement wealth, 0.0119 (0.217) for the total rate of saving, and 0.133 (2.437) for total
wealth.When we include economic knowledge as an explanatory variable in all other speciﬁcations, the
changes in the coefﬁcients of our education variable are of the same small order of magnitude.1514 B.D. Bernheim, D.M. Garrett / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 1487–1519
educational programs, the availability of these programs should be most closely
related to the preferences of those who are most inclined to save. One would then
expect to observe a stronger ‘effect’ for the 75th percentile than for the 25th
percentile or the median.
5.1.4. Comparisons across different measures of wealth accumulation
As we mentioned at the end of Section 4, the absence of a clear relation between
education and total wealth, coupled with evidence of strong associations with other
measures of asset accumulation, is a puzzle that requires resolution before one can
conﬁdently interpret our ﬁndings. If education has no effect on saving, it is
difﬁcult to explain this puzzle by positing a positive conditional correlation
between the availability of ﬁnancial education and the underlying predisposition to
save. The hypothesized correlation should generate a spurious ‘effect’ for total
wealth, just as it is assumed to do for other measures of asset accumulation.
5.2. The omission of pension plan features
Data limitations preclude us from controlling for various pension plan features
such as the rate at which an employer matches contributions. We doubt that these
omissions explain our ﬁndings for four reasons. First, the correlation between
matching and educational efforts across employers is slightly negative and
statistically insigniﬁcant, while the correlations between education and other plan
features (number of investment options, loan provisions, etc.) are generally small
(see Bayer et al., 1996). Second, existing studies have not identiﬁed large
quantitative relations between plan activity and plan features. The available
evidence on the effects of matching provisions is somewhat mixed (see Papke,
1995; Andrews, 1992; Papke et al., 1996; Scott, 1994). Other features do not
appear to have dramatic effects on participation or contributions (Bayer et al.,
1996). Third, participants may alter behavior outside of pension plans to offset the
effects of provisions that induce greater saving within these plans. Consequently,
the omission of controls for plan features is a particularly suspect explanation for
the observed relation between the availability of ﬁnancial education and the overall
rate of saving. Finally, improvements in respondent’s 401(k) plans should reduce
participation in spouses’ pension plans as households shift retirement saving to the
more attractive plan.
5.3. The possibility that education affects reporting
It is difﬁcult to distinguish effects of education on behavior from effects on
reporting. Nevertheless, reporting effects poorly account for certain aspects of our
results. We consider two speciﬁc concerns. First, individuals may tend to report
falsely that they actually behave as they are taught to behave. It is, however,
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rates of saving for retirement and overall, and respondent’s 401(k) balances, but
not total wealth or spouse’s 401(k) balances. Second, education may affect the
way an individual deﬁnes a variable. However, this problem is presumably not a
concern for 401(k) balances and participation. Indeed, if educational programs
increase awareness of 401(k) plans without raising participation, then measured
rates of participation should be lower—not higher—when education is available.
5.4. New saving versus asset shifting?
Controlling for other observable characteristics, all measures of retirement
saving are signiﬁcantly higher on average and among low and moderate savers
when the respondent’s employer provides ﬁnancial education. In contrast, evidence
concerning the effect of ﬁnancial education on total accumulation is mixed.
Overall rates of saving are higher on average and among low and moderate savers
when the respondent’s employer offers ﬁnancial education, but net wealth is not.
The appropriate interpretation of our results hinges on the resolution of this puzzle.
One possible explanation for this puzzle proceeds from the joint hypothesis that
ﬁnancial education stimulates overall saving, and that its availability is negatively
correlated with underlying predispositions to save. Most retirement education
programs were relatively new as of 1994. The effect of education on ﬂows should
be proportionately larger, and more easily detectable, than the effect on stocks of
wealth because stocks reﬂect all past choices, including those made prior to the
availability of education. If ﬁnancial education is negatively correlated with the
predisposition to save (conditional on other characteristics), then, in cases where
educational programs are sufﬁciently recent, stocks of wealth may actually be
lower for those who have access to employer-based education, even if education
stimulates rates of saving. These considerations are less problematic for retirement
wealth than for total wealth since stocks of retirement wealth are typically very
low to begin with (a given change in rate of ﬂow should manifest itself more
quickly in the stock when the range of initial stocks is small).
There are, however, other possible explanations for the puzzle. If ﬁnancial
education induces individuals to ﬁnance greater retirement saving through
borrowing, and if these individuals fail to count borrowing as negative saving, one
would observe a positive relationship between education and the self-reported rate
of saving (even though households are merely shifting assets), but no relationship
between education and net wealth. This possibility exempliﬁes a more general
issue: respondents may deﬁne self-reported rates of saving too narrowly in the
sense that they either ignore dissaving or omit important components of asset
accumulation. Notably, 8.8% of respondents indicated that their rates of saving for
retirement exceeded their overall rates of saving. This indicates a proclivity to net
out some forms of dissaving when contemplating total rates of accumulation.
However, no respondent reported a negative rate of saving. This corroborates the
view that individuals do not think of borrowing as negative saving.1516 B.D. Bernheim, D.M. Garrett / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 1487–1519
Fortunately, the asset-shifting hypothesis has additional testable implications
concerning the relation between ﬁnancial education and speciﬁc components of
total wealth. It is, for example, difﬁcult to imagine that the self-reported rate of
overall saving excludes changes in gross ﬁnancial assets. Consequently, if the
availability of ﬁnancial education is associated with a higher self-reported rate of
overall saving simply because this rate excludes the components of net wealth
from which assets are shifted, ﬁnancial education should also be associated with
higher levels of gross ﬁnancial assets. The offsetting decline would, of necessity,
show up in some other asset/liability category, such as debt.
To investigate the validity of the aforementioned prediction, we estimated OLS
(percentage rank) and quantile regressions for gross ﬁnancial wealth, net housing
wealth (market value minus mortgage balance), miscellaneous debt, and other
wealth (including business and property net of associated mortgages).We omit the
detailed results to conserve space. The coefﬁcients of the key education variable
are slightly negative and statistically insigniﬁcant in the speciﬁcations for ﬁnancial
wealth and other wealth, positive and in some instances statistically signiﬁcant for
net housing wealth, and positive and in some instances marginally statistically
signiﬁcant for miscellaneous debt. By themselves, the results for miscellaneous
debt appear consistent with the view that education induces individuals to ﬁnance
retirement contributions, at least in part, through borrowing, and that these
individuals neglect the resulting increase in debt when reporting overall rates of
saving. In contrast, the regressions for net housing wealth and other wealth provide
little or no support for the view that individuals ﬁnance retirement contributions by
33 borrowing against homes or other real property, or by accumulating less property.
Most importantly, the results for ﬁnancial wealth undermine the asset shifting
hypothesis by contradicting the speciﬁc prediction mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. In contrast, these ﬁndings are easily reconciled with the joint hypoth-
esis that education increases total saving, and that its availability is negatively
correlated with the underlying predisposition to save.
6. Conclusions
We have used a novel household survey to investigate the efﬁcacy of employer-
based ﬁnancial education. Our primary focus has concerned the effects of these
programs on saving, both in general and for the purposes of retirement. While a
small number of previous papers have examined related issues, all have focused
exclusively on decisions pertaining to pension plans; none examine the impact of
ﬁnancial education on broad measures of saving. The current study makes a unique
33While the estimated relationship between the availability of ﬁnancial education and other wealth is
negative, it is far too small to explain the increase in retirement assets or in self-reported rates of
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contribution to the literature by providing the only available evidence concerning
the relation between ﬁnancial education in the workplace and reasonably broad
measures of household saving (including saving outside of pension plans).
Holding ﬁxed a wide range of observable characteristics including pension
status, virtually all measures of retirement accumulation (both stocks and ﬂows)
are signiﬁcantly higher on average and at the 25th and 50th percentiles when the
respondent’s employer offers ﬁnancial education. Rates of participation in 401(k)
plans are also signiﬁcantly higher, both for the respondent and for his or her
spouse, when ﬁnancial education is available. For measures of total accumulation,
the evidence is mixed. There is a signiﬁcant relationship on average and at the
25th and 50th percentiles for the rate of saving (a ﬂow variable), but essentially no
relationship for total wealth (a stock variable). For the 75th percentile, none of the
estimated coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels of conﬁ-
dence.
We have interpreted these ﬁndings in light of several potential confounding
considerations: that the availability of ﬁnancial education in the workplace may be
systematically correlated with the underlying predisposition to save, that our
estimates may confound the effects of unobserved plan characteristics, and that
education may affect reporting, rather than behavior. Though we are cognizant of
the limitations of cross-sectional analysis, we believe that our results favor the
hypothesis that ﬁnancial education signiﬁcantly stimulates retirement saving
among low and moderate savers. Further analysis supports the view that this effect
represents a net contribution to total saving rather than asset shifting.
Our analysis has potentially important implications concerning the efﬁcacy of
strategies to stimulate saving by US households. Most obviously, it raises the
prospect that a serious national campaign to promote saving through education and
information could have a meaningful impact on behavior, particularly among those
who save the least.
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